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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of saving for retired single people
that includes heterogeneity in medical expenses and life expectancies,
and bequest motives. We estimate the model using AHEAD data and
the method of simulated moments. Out-of-pocket medical expenses
rise quickly with age and permanent income. The risk of living long
and requiring expensive medical care is a key driver of saving for many
higher income elderly. Social insurance programs such as Medicaid
rationalize the low asset holdings of the poorest, but also beneﬁt the
rich, by insuring them against high medical expenses at the ends of
their lives.
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11 Introduction
Many elderly keep large amounts of assets until very late in life. Further-
more, the income-rich run down their assets more slowly than the income-
poor. Why is this the case?
To answer this question, we estimate a life cycle model of saving on a
sample of single, retired elderly individuals. The key elements in our frame-
work are risky and heterogenous medical expenses, risky and heterogenous
life expectancy, a government-provided minimum consumption level (or “con-
sumption ﬂoor”, which is income and asset-tested), and bequest motives.
Our main result is that medical expenditures are important in explaining
the observed savings of the elderly, especially the richer ones. For example,
our baseline model predicts that, as in the data, between ages 74 and 84 me-
dian assets for those in the top permanent income quintile fall from $170,000
to $130,000. When we eliminate all out-of-pocket medical expenses, median
assets for this group are predicted to fall much more, from $170,000 at age
74 to $60,000 at age 84.
This result is due to an important feature of out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses data that we estimate: average medical expenditures rise very rapidly
with age and income. For example, our model predicts that average annual
out-of-pocket medical expenditures rise from $1,100 at age 75 to $9,200 at
age 95. While a 95-year-old in the bottom quintile of the permanent income
distribution expects to spend $1,700 a year on medical expenses, a person
of the same age in the top quintile expects to spend $15,800. Medical needs
that rise with age provide the elderly with a strong incentive to save, and
medical expenses that rise with permanent income encourage the rich to be
more frugal.
We show that the consumption ﬂoor also has an eﬀect on saving decisions
at all levels of income. When we reduce old-age consumption insurance
by 20%, median assets for 90-year-olds in the highest permanent income
quintile increase from $100,000 to $120,000, while median assets for 90-year-
olds in the second highest quintile increase from $40,000 to $50,000. The
net worth of those in the third and fourth income quintiles also increases.
The consumption ﬂoor thus matters for wealthy individuals as well as poorer
ones. This is perhaps unsurprising given the size of our estimated medical
needs for the old and income-rich; even wealthy households can be ﬁnancially
decimated by medical needs in very old age.
We further ﬁnd that heterogeneity in mortality is large and is important
2for understanding the savings patterns of the elderly. In particular, diﬀeren-
tial mortality gives rise to a bias that makes the surviving elderly seem more
thrifty than they actually are. While a 70-year-old man in poor health in
the bottom income quintile expects to live only six more years, a 70-year-old
woman in good health and in the top income quintile expects to live 17 more
years. Failure to account for the mortality bias would lead us to understate
asset decumulation by over 50% for the 74 year-old people in our sample.
Consistently with the data, our model allows people who are rich, healthy,
and female to live longer1 and generates asset proﬁles consistent with these
observations.
Finally, we ﬁnd that bequests are luxury goods, and that bequest motives
are potentially quite important for the richest retirees. Our estimates of the
bequest motive, however, are very imprecise and for most of our sample,
savings barely change when the bequest motive is eliminated. One reason
why the bequest motive is weakly identiﬁed is that even in the top permanent
income quintile, median assets in our sample of elderly singles never exceed
$200,000; hence we do not have enough “super-rich” individuals to pin down
the bequest motive.
The above results are based on a life cycle model that takes out-of-pocket
medical expenses as exogenous. That is, we ﬁrst use the Assets and Health
Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, to estimate stochastic pro-
cesses for mortality and out-of pocket medical expenditures as functions of
sex, health, permanent income, and age. We then estimate our model using
the method of simulated moments, where the model’s preference parame-
ters are chosen so that the permanent income-conditional median age-asset
proﬁles simulated from the model match those in the data, cohort by cohort.
The additional sources of heterogeneity that we consider allow the model
to match important aspects of the data: our estimated structural model is
not rejected when we test its over-identifying restrictions. In addition, the
distribution of deceased persons’ estates generated by our model matches up
closely with that observed in the data.
Despite the good ﬁt of the model to the data, one might think that some
of the results, such as the responses of savings to changes in government
insurance, might not be robust to allowing the retirees to adjust both savings
1See Attanasio and Emmerson [4], and Deaton and Paxon [19] for evidence on per-
manent income and mortality. See Hurd et al. [41] for evidence on health status and
mortality.
3and medical expenses. As a robustness check, we construct a model in which
retirees choose savings as well as medical expenses.
In this version of the model, retirees derive utility from consuming medical
goods and services. The magnitude of this utility depends on “medical needs”
shocks, which in turn depend on age and health. Retirees optimally choose
medical and non-medical consumption, while taking into account the cost-
sharing provided by insurance and their own resources. We estimate this
version of the model by requiring it to ﬁt observed out-of-pocket medical
expenditures as well as observed asset holdings.
Importantly, although our medical needs shocks do not depend on per-
manent income, in our model out-of-pocket medical expenditures rise with
both permanent income and age, as in the data. Medicaid pays for most of
the medical expenses of the poor, who thus have little or no out-of-pocket
medical expenses, but not for those of the rich, who pay out-of-pocket for
their own, higher quality medical care. For this reason, Medicaid plays an
important role in generating the correlation between out-of-pocket medical
expenses and income. Moreover, we ﬁnd that medical expenditures and the
consumption ﬂoor have large eﬀects on saving even when medical expenses
are a choice variable.
The intuition for why medical needs are so important, even when people
can adjust their medical expenditure, is that out-of-pocket medical expen-
ditures found in the model have to match those in the data. This implies
that high-income 70-year-olds anticipate that if they live into their nineties,
they will probably choose to make large medical expenditures – like the 90-
year-olds in our sample – and will probably save to pay for them. Once this
feature of the data is taken into account, it is not surprising that medical
expenditures have large eﬀects on savings, whether they are exogenous or
chosen.
Making medical expenses endogenous reduces the eﬀects of social insur-
ance on savings. The eﬀects that remain, however, are still stronger at higher
income levels than at lower ones, because the out-of-pocket medical expenses
of the richest people are much higher than those of the poorest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the
most closely related literature. In section 3, we introduce our version of the
life cycle model, and in section 4, we discuss our estimation procedure. In
sections 5 and 6, we describe the data and the estimated shock processes
that elderly individuals face. We discuss parameter estimates and model ﬁt
in section 7. Section 8 contains some decomposition exercises that gauge the
4forces aﬀecting saving behavior. In section 9 we develop a version of the
model where medical expenses are a choice variable, estimate the model, and
use it to perform some robustness checks. We conclude in section 10.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a number of papers in the savings literature that
consider either uncertain medical expenditures or bequest motives.
In an early study, Kotlikoﬀ [48] ﬁnds that out-of-pocket medical expen-
ditures are potentially an important driver of aggregate saving. However,
Kotlikoﬀ also stresses the need for better data on medical expenses and for
more realistic modeling of this source of risk.
Subsequent works by Hubbard et al. [38] and Palumbo [56] ﬁnd that
medical expenses have fairly small eﬀects compared to the ones we ﬁnd. Their
eﬀects are smaller because their data understate the extent to which medical
expenditures rise with age and income. As an example, the average medical
expense for a 100-year-old generated by Hubbard et al.’s medical expenditure
model is about 16% of the average medical expense for a 100-year-old found
in our data. Our data set contains detailed information for a large number
of very old individuals. This richness allows us to provide a more precise
picture of how medical expenses rise at very advanced ages. Furthermore,
our data have information on nursing home expenses in addition to other
forms of medical expenses. Previous studies of medical expense risk had to
impute nursing home expenses.
Hubbard et al. [39] and Scholz et al. [62] argue that means-tested social
insurance programs (in the form of a minimum consumption ﬂoor) provide
strong incentives for low income individuals not to save. Their simulations,
however, indicate that reducing the consumption ﬂoor has little eﬀect on the
consumption of college graduates. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the consumption
ﬂoor has an eﬀect on saving decisions at all levels of income. Because out-
of-pocket medical expenditures rise rapidly with income, rich individuals
value social insurance as a safeguard against catastrophic expenses, even if
they often end up not using it. This ﬁnding is consistent with Brown and
Finkelstein’s work [10], which ﬁnds Medicaid has large eﬀects on the decisions
of fairly rich people.
Scholz et al. [62] ﬁnd that a life cycle model, augmented with realistic
income and medical expense uncertainty, does good job of ﬁtting the distri-
5bution of wealth at retirement. We add to their paper by showing that a
realistic life cycle model can do a good job of ﬁtting the patterns of asset
decumulation observed after retirement.
In his seminal paper Hurd [40] estimates a simple structural model of sav-
ings and bequest motives in which bequests are normal goods, and does not
ﬁnd support for large bequest motives. De Nardi’s [17] calibration exercise
shows that modeling bequests as a luxury good is important to explain the
savings of the richest few. Kopczuk and Lupton [51] ﬁnd that a majority of
elderly singles have a bequest motive. However, whether the motive is active
or not depends on the individual’s ﬁnancial resources because, consistently
with De Nardi, they estimate bequests to be luxury goods. While none of
the preceding papers accounted for medical expenses, Dynan et al. [24] argue
that the same assets can be used to address both precautionary and bequest
concerns. Using responses from an attitudinal survey to separate bequest and
medical expense motives, Ameriks et al. [2] ﬁnd that bequests are important
for many people. In this paper we allow bequests to be luxury goods, and
we let the AHEAD data speak to both the intensity of bequest motives and
the level of wealth at which they become operative.
3 The model
Our analysis focuses on people who have retired already. This choice al-
lows us to concentrate on saving and consumption decisions, and to abstract
from labor supply and retirement decisions. We restrict our analysis to el-
derly singles to avoid dealing with household dynamics, such as the transition
from two to one family members.
Consider a single person, either male or female, seeking to maximize his or
her expected lifetime utility at age t, t = tr+1,...,T, where tr is the retirement
age. These individuals maximize their utility by choosing consumption c.
Each period, the individual’s utility depends on its consumption and health
status, h, which can be either good (h = 1) or bad (h = 0).





with ν ≥ 0. Following Palumbo [56] we model the dependence of utility on
health status as
δ(h) = 1 + δh, (2)
6so that when δ = 0, health status does not aﬀect utility.
When the person dies, any remaining assets are left to his or her heirs.
We denote with e the estate net of taxes. The utility the household derives






where θ is the intensity of the bequest motive, while k determines the cur-
vature of the bequest function and hence the extent to which bequests are
luxury goods.
We assume that non-asset income yt, is a deterministic function of sex,
g, permanent income, I, and age t:
yt = y(g,I,t). (4)
The individual faces several sources of risk, which we treat as exogenous.
While this is of course a simpliﬁcation, we believe that it is a reasonable one,
because we focus on older people who have already shaped their health and
lifestyle.
1) Health status uncertainty. We allow the transition probabilities for
health status to depend on previous health, sex, permanent income and age.
The elements of the health status transition matrix are
πj,k,g,I,t = Pr(ht+1 = k|ht = j,g,I,t), j,k ∈ {1,0}. (5)
2) Survival uncertainty. Let sg,h,I,t denote the probability that an indi-
vidual of sex g is alive at age t+1, conditional on being alive at age t, having
time-t health status h, and enjoying permanent income I.
3) Medical expense uncertainty. Medical expenses, mt, are deﬁned as out-
of-pocket expenses. Since our focus is on understanding the eﬀects of out-of-
pocket medical expenses on saving decisions, this version of the model takes
medical expenses as exogenous shocks to the household’s available resources
for our benchmark model, as in Scholz et al. [62], Palumbo [56] and Hubbard
et al. [38, 39]. In section 9 we study whether endogenizing medical expenses
aﬀects our key results.
We assume that the mean and the variance of the log of medical expenses
depend upon sex, health status, permanent income, and age:
lnmt = m(g,h,I,t) + σ(g,h,I,t) × ψt. (6)
7Following Feenberg and Skinner [28] and French and Jones [34], we assume
that the idiosyncratic component ψt can be decomposed as
ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ξ), (7)
ζt = ρmζt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ǫ), (8)
where ξt and ǫt are serially and mutually independent. In practice, we
discretize ξ and ζ, using quadrature methods described in Tauchen and
Hussey [64].
The timing is the following: at the beginning of the period the individual’s
health status and medical medical expenses are realized. Then the individual
consumes and saves. Finally the survival shock hits. Households who die
leave any remaining assets to their heirs.
Next period’s assets are given by
at+1 = at + yn(rat + yt,τ) + bt − mt − ct, (9)
where yn(rat + yt,τ) denotes post-tax income, r denotes the risk-free, pre-
tax rate of return, the vector τ describes the tax structure, and bt denotes
government transfers.
Assets have to satisfy a borrowing constraint:
at ≥ 0. (10)
Following Hubbard et al. [38, 39], we also assume that government transfers
provide a consumption ﬂoor:
bt = max{0,c + mt − [at + yn(rat + yt,τ)]}, (11)
Equation (11) says that government transfers bridge the gap between an indi-
vidual’s “total resources” (i.e., assets plus income less medical expenses) and
the consumption ﬂoor. To be consistent with logic of asset and means-tested
transfers present in public insurance programs, we impose that if transfers
are positive, ct = c and at+1 = 0.
To save on state variables we follow Deaton [18] and redeﬁne the problem
in terms of cash-on-hand, xt. Deﬁning cash-on-hand allows us to combine
assets and the transitory component of medical expenses into a single state
variable,
xt = at + yn(rat + yt,τ) + bt − mt. (12)
8Note that assets and cash-on-hand follow:
at+1 = xt − ct, (13)
xt+1 = xt − ct + yn
￿
r(xt − ct) + yt+1,τ
￿
+ bt+1 − mt+1. (14)
To enforce the consumption ﬂoor, we impose
xt ≥ c, ∀t, (15)
and to ensure that assets are always non-negative, we require
ct ≤ xt, ∀t. (16)
Note that all of the variables in xt are given and known at the beginning
of period t. We can thus write the individual’s problem recursively, using the
deﬁnition of cash-on-hand. Letting β denote the discount factor, the value









et = (xt − ct) − max{0, ˜ τ · (xt − ct − ˜ x)}. (18)
and equations (14) - (16). The parameter ˜ τ denotes the tax rate on estates
in excess of ˜ x, the estate exemption level.
4 Estimation procedure
4.1 The Method of Simulated Moments
To estimate the model, we adopt a two-step strategy, similar to the one
used by Gourinchas and Parker [36], Cagetti [12], and French and Jones [35].
In the ﬁrst step we estimate or calibrate those parameters that can be cleanly
identiﬁed without explicitly using our model. For example, we estimate mor-
tality rates from raw demographic data. Let χ denote the collection of these
ﬁrst-step parameters.
9In the second step we estimate the vector of parameters ∆ = (δ,ν,β,c,θ,k)
with the method of simulated moments (MSM), taking as given the elements
of χ that were estimated in the ﬁrst step. In particular, we ﬁnd the vector ˆ ∆
yielding the simulated life-cycle decision proﬁles that “best match” (as mea-
sured by a GMM criterion function) the proﬁles from the data. Because our
underlying motivations are to explain why elderly individuals retain so many
assets, and to explain why individuals with high income save at a higher rate,
we match permanent income-conditional age-asset proﬁles.
Consider individual i of birth cohort p in calendar year t. Note that
the individual’s age is t − p. Let ait denote individual i’s assets. Sorting
the sample by permanent income, we assign every individual to one of Q
quantile-based intervals. In practice, we split the sample into 5 permanent
income quintiles, so that Q = 5. Suppose that individual i of cohort p falls
in the qth interval of the sample income distribution. Let apqt(∆,χ) be the
model-predicted median asset level in calendar year t for an individual of
cohort p that was in the qth income interval. Assuming that observed assets
have a continuous density, at the “true” parameter vector (∆0,χ0) exactly
half of the individuals in group pqt will have asset levels of apqt(∆0,χ0) or
less. This leads to a well-known set of moment conditions:2
E
￿
1{ait ≤ apqt(∆0,χ0)} − 1/2|p,q,t,individual i alive at t
￿
= 0, (19)
for each p, q and t triple. In other words, for each permanent income-cohort
grouping, the model and the data have the same median asset levels. Our
decision to use conditional medians, rather than means, reﬂects sample size
considerations; in some pqt cells, changes in one or two individuals can lead
to sizeable changes in mean wealth. Sample size considerations also lead us
to combine men and women in a single moment condition.
The mechanics of our MSM approach are fairly standard. We compute
life-cycle histories for a large number of artiﬁcial individuals. Each of these
individuals is endowed with a value of the state vector (t,xt,g,ht,I,ζt) drawn
from the data distribution for 1996, and each is assigned a series of health,
medical expense, and mortality shocks consistent with the stochastic pro-
cesses described in section 2 above. We give each simulated person the entire
health and mortality history realized by a person in the AHEAD data with
2See Manski [52], Powell [59] and Buchinsky [11]. Related methodologies are applied
in Cagetti [12] and Epple and Sieg [27].
10the same initial conditions.3 Since the data provide health and mortality
only during interview years, we simulate it in oﬀ-years using our estimated
models and Bayes’ Rule. The simulated medical expenditure shocks ζ and
ξ are Monte Carlo draws from discretized versions of our estimated shock
processes.
We discretize the asset grid and, using value function iteration, we solve
the model numerically. This yields a set of decision rules, which, in combina-
tion with the simulated endowments and shocks, allows us to simulate each
individual’s assets, medical expenditures, health and mortality. We then
compute asset proﬁles (values of apqt) from the artiﬁcial histories in the same
way as we compute them from the real data.
We adjust ∆ until the diﬀerence between the data and simulated proﬁles—
a GMM criterion function based on equation (19)—is minimized.
We discuss the asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates, the
weighting matrix and the overidentiﬁcation tests in Appendix A.4
The codes solving for the value functions and simulating households’ his-
tories are written in C. We use GAUSS for the econometrics. The GAUSS
programs call the C programs, send them the necessary inputs - including
parameter values and initial values of the state variables - and retrieve the
simulated histories. The GAUSS programs then use the simulated histories
and the data to compute the GMM criterion function, and/or to produce
output items such as graphs and tables.
4.2 Econometric Considerations
In estimating our model, we face two well-known econometric problems.
First, in a cross-section, older individuals will have earned their labor income
in earlier calendar years than younger ones. Because wages have increased
over time (with productivity), this means that older individuals are poorer at
every age, and the measured saving proﬁle will overstate asset decumulation
over the life cycle. Put diﬀerently, even if the elderly do not run down their
assets, our data will show that assets decline with age, as older individuals
3This approach ensures that the simulated health and mortality processes are fully
consistent with the data, even if our parsimonious models of these processes are just an
approximation. We are grateful to Michael Hurd for suggesting this approach.
4Major theoretical contributions to the method of simulated moments include Pakes
and Pollard [55] and Duﬃe and Singleton [23]. Other useful references on asymptotic
theory include Newey [53], Newey and McFadden [54] and Powell [59].
11will have lower lifetime incomes and assets at each age. Not accounting for
this eﬀect will lead us to estimate a model that overstates the degree to which
elderly people run down their assets (Shorrocks [63]).
Second, wealthier people tend to live longer, so that the average survivor
in each cohort has higher lifetime income than the average deceased member
of that cohort. This “mortality bias” tends to overstate asset growth in an
unbalanced panel. In addition, as time passes and people die, the surviving
people will be, relative to the deceased, healthy and female. These healthy
and female people, knowing that they will live longer, will tend to be more
frugal than their deceased counterparts, and hence have a ﬂatter asset proﬁle
in retirement. Not accounting for mortality bias will lead us to understate
the degree to which elderly people run down their assets.
A major advantage of using a structural approach is that we can address
these biases directly, by replicating them in our simulations. We address
the ﬁrst problem by giving our simulated individuals age, wealth, health,
gender and income endowments drawn from the distribution observed in the
data. If older people have lower lifetime incomes in our data, they will have
lower lifetime incomes in our simulations. Furthermore, we match assets at
each age, conditional on cohort and income quintile. We address the second
problem by allowing mortality to diﬀer with sex, permanent income and
health status. As a result our estimated decision rules and our simulated
proﬁles incorporate mortality eﬀects in the same way as the data.
5 Data
The AHEAD is part of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) con-
ducted by the University of Michigan. It is a survey of individuals who were
non-institutionalized and aged 70 or older in 1994. A total of 8,222 individu-
als in 6,047 households (in other words, 3,872 singles and 2,175 couples) were
interviewed for the AHEAD survey in late 1993/early 1994, which we refer
to as 1994. These individuals were interviewed again in 1996, 1998, 2000,
2002, 2004, and 2006. The AHEAD data include a nationally representative
core sample as well as additional samples of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida
residents.
We consider only single retired individuals in the analysis. This leaves us
with 3,259 individuals, of whom 592 are men and 2,667 are women. Of these
3,259 individuals, 884 are still alive in 2006. Appendix B gives more details
12on the data.
Our measure of net worth (or assets) is the sum of all assets less mortgages
and other debts. The AHEAD has information on the value of housing
and real estate, autos, liquid assets (which include money market accounts,
savings accounts, T-bills, etc.), IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, the value of a farm
or business, mutual funds, bonds, and “other” assets. We do not use 1994
assets because they were underreported (Rohwedder et al. [60]).
Non-asset income includes the value of Social Security beneﬁts, deﬁned
beneﬁt pension beneﬁts, annuities, veterans beneﬁts, welfare, and food stamps.
We measure permanent income (PI) as the individual’s average income over
all periods during which he or she is observed. Because Social Security ben-
eﬁts and (for the most part) pension beneﬁts are a monotonic function of
average lifetime labor income, this provides a reasonable measure of lifetime,
or permanent income.5
Medical expenses are the sum of what the individual spends out of pocket
on insurance premia, drug costs, and costs for hospital, nursing home care,
doctor visits, dental visits, and outpatient care. It includes medical expenses
during the last year of life. It does not include expenses covered by insurance,
either public or private. French and Jones [34] show that the medical expense
data in the AHEAD line up with the aggregate statistics. For our sample,
mean medical expenses are $3,712 with a standard deviation of $13,429 in
1998 dollars. Although this ﬁgure is large, it is not surprising, because Medi-
care did not cover prescription drugs for most of the sample period, requires
co-pays for services, and caps the number of reimbursed nursing home and
hospital nights.
In addition to constructing moment conditions, we also use the AHEAD
data to construct the initial distribution of permanent income, age, sex,
health, medical expenses, and cash-on-hand that starts oﬀ our simulations.
Each simulated individual is given a state vector drawn from the joint dis-
tribution of state variables observed in 1996.
5Because annuity income often reﬂects the earnings of a deceased spouse, our measure
of permanent income is not so much a measure of the individual’s own lifetime income as
it is a measure of the income of his or her household.
136 Data proﬁles and ﬁrst step estimation re-
sults
In this section we describe the life cycle proﬁles of the stochastic processes
(e.g., medical expenditures) that are inputs to our dynamic programming
model, and the asset proﬁles we want our model to explain.
6.1 Asset proﬁles
We construct the permanent-income-conditional age-asset proﬁles as fol-
lows. We sort individuals into permanent income quintiles, and we track
birth-year cohorts. We work with 5 cohorts. The ﬁrst cohort consists of
individuals that were ages 72-76 in 1996; the second cohort contains ages
77-81; the third ages 82-86; the fourth ages 87-91; and the ﬁnal cohort, for
sample size reasons, contains ages 92-102. We use asset data for 6 diﬀerent
years; 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. To construct the proﬁles, we
calculate cell medians for the survivors for each year assets are observed.
To ﬁx ideas, consider Figure 1, which plots median assets by age and
income quintile for the members of two birth-year cohorts that are still alive
at each moment in time. The solid lines at the far left of the graph are for the
youngest cohort, whose members in 1996 were aged 72-76, with an average
age of 74. The dashed set of lines are for the cohort aged 82-86 in 1996.
There are ﬁve lines for each cohort because we have split the data into
permanent income quintiles. However, the ﬁfth, bottom line is hard to dis-
tinguish from the horizontal axis because households in the lowest permanent
income quintile hold few assets.
The members of the ﬁrst cohort appear in our sample at an average age
of 74 in 1996. We then observe them in 1998, when they are on average 76
years old, and then again every two years until 2006. The other cohorts start
from older initial ages, and are followed for ten years, until 2006. The graph
reports median assets for each cohort and permanent-income grouping for
six data points over time.
Unsurprisingly, assets turn out to be monotonically increasing in income,
so that the bottom line shows median assets in the lowest income quintile,
while the top line shows median assets in the top quintile. For example, the
top left line shows that for the top PI quintile of the cohort age 74 in 1996,
median assets started at $170,000 and then stayed rather stable over time:
14$150,000 at age 76, $160,000 at age 78, $180,000 at ages 80 and 82, and
$190,000 at age 84.
Figure 1: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data. Solid line: cohort aged
74 in 1996. Dashed line, cohort aged 85 in 1996.
For all permanent income quintiles in these cohorts, the assets of surviving
individuals neither rise rapidly nor decline rapidly with age. If anything,
those with high income tend to have increases in their assets, whereas those
with low income tend to have declines in assets as they age. The proﬁles for
other cohorts, which are shown in Appendix B, are similar.
Our ﬁnding that the income-rich elderly dissave more slowly complements
and conﬁrms those by Dynan et al. [25].
Figure 2 compares asset proﬁles that are aggregated over all the income
quintiles. The solid line shows median assets for everyone observed at a given
point in time, even if they died in a subsequent wave, i.e., the unbalanced
panel. The dashed line shows median assets for the subsample of individuals
who were still alive in the ﬁnal wave, i.e., the balanced panel. It shows that
the asset proﬁles for those that were alive in the ﬁnal wave—the balanced
panel—have much more of a downward slope. The diﬀerence between the
two sets of proﬁles conﬁrms that the people who died during our sample
period tended to have lower assets than the survivors.
The ﬁrst pair of lines in Figure 2 shows that failing to account for mor-
tality bias would lead us to understate the asset decumulation of those who
15Figure 2: Median assets by birth cohort: everyone in the data (solid lines) vs.
survivors (dashed lines).
were 74 years old in 1996 by over 50%. In 1996 median assets of the 74-
year-olds who survived to 2006 were $84,000. In contrast, in 1996 median
assets for all 74 year olds alive in that year were $60,000. Median assets of
those in the same cohort who survived to 2006 were $44,000. The implied
drops in median assets between 1996 and 2006 for that cohort are therefore
vastly diﬀerent depending on what population we look at: only $16,000 if
we look at the unbalanced panel, but $40,000 for the balanced panel of the
survivors who made it to 2006. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Love
et al. [50]. Sorting the data by permanent income reduces, but does not
eliminate, mortality bias.
Since our model explicitly takes mortality bias and diﬀerences in perma-
nent income into account, it is the unbalanced panels that we use in our
MSM estimation procedure. This greatly increases the size of our estimation
sample.
6.2 Medical expense proﬁles
The mean of logged medical expenses is modeled as a function of: a
quartic in age, sex, sex interacted with age, current health status, health
status interacted with age, a quadratic in the individual’s permanent income
ranking, and permanent income ranking interacted with age. We estimate
16these proﬁles using a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator.6
We use ﬁxed eﬀects, rather than OLS, for two reasons. First, diﬀerential
mortality causes the composition of our sample to vary with age. In contrast,
we are interested in how medical expenses vary for the same individuals as
they grow older. Although conditioning on observables such as permanent
income partly overcomes this problem, it may not entirely. The ﬁxed-eﬀects
estimator overcomes the problem completely. Second, cohort eﬀects are likely
to be important for both of these variables. Failure to account for the fact
that younger cohorts have higher average medical expenditures than older
cohorts will lead the econometrician to understate the extent to which med-
ical expenses grow with age. Cohort eﬀects are automatically captured in a
ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator, as the cohort eﬀect is merely the average ﬁxed eﬀect
for all members of that cohort.
The combined variance of the medical expense shocks (ζt+ξt) is modeled
with the same variables and functional form as the mean (see equation 6).
Our estimates indicate that average medical expenses for men are about
20% lower than for women, conditional on age, health and permanent income.
Average medical expenses for healthy people are about 50% lower than for
unhealthy people, conditional on age, sex and permanent income. These
diﬀerences are large, but the diﬀerences across permanent income groups are
even larger.
To better interpret our estimates, we simulate medical expense histories
for the AHEAD birth-year cohort whose members were ages 72-76 (with an
average age of 74) in 1996. We begin the simulations with draws from the
joint distribution of age, health, permanent income and sex observed in 1996.
Figure 3 presents average medical expenses, conditional on age and per-
manent income quintile for a balanced sample of people. We rule out at-
trition in these simulations because it is easier to understand how medical
expenses evolve over time when tracking the same individuals. The picture
with mortality bias, however, is similar. Permanent income has a large ef-
fect on average medical expenses, especially at older ages. Average medical
expenses are less than $1,000 a year at age 75, and vary little with income.
By age 100, they rise to $2,900 for those in the bottom quintile of the in-
come distribution, and to almost $38,000 for those at the top of the income
6Parameter estimates for the data generating process for medical expenses, income,
health, and mortality, and a guide to using these data, are available at: http://
www.chicagofed.org/economic research and data/economists preview.cfm?autID=29.
17Figure 3: Average medical expenses, by permanent income quintile.
distribution. Mean medical expenses at age 100 are $17,700.
Mean medical expenses implied by our estimated processes line up with
the raw data. We have 58 observations on medical expenses for 100-year-
old individuals, averaging $15,603 (with a standard deviation of $33,723 and
a standard error of $4,428) per year, with 72% of these expenses coming
from nursing home care. Between ages 95 and 100, we have 725 person-
year observations on medical expenses, averaging $9,227 (with a standard
deviation of $19,988 and standard error of $737). Therefore, the data indicate
that average medical expenses for the elderly are high.
Medical expenses for the elderly are volatile as well as high. We ﬁnd
that the average variance of log medical expenses is 2.53. This implies that
medical expenses for someone with a two standard deviation shock to medical
expenses pays 6.8 times the average, conditional on the observables.7 The
variance of medical expenses rises with age, bad health, and income.
French and Jones [34] ﬁnd that a suitably-constructed lognormal distri-
bution can match average medical expenses and the far right tail of the
distribution. They also ﬁnd that medical expenses are highly correlated over
7We assume that medical expenses are log-normally distributed, so the predicted level




, where m denotes predicted log medical expenses
and σ2 denotes the variance of the idiosyncratic shock ψt. The ratio of the level of
medical expenses two standard deviations above the mean to average medical expenses is
exp(m+2σ)
exp(m+σ2/2) = exp(2σ − σ2/2) = 6.80 if σ =
√
2.53.
18time. Table 1 shows estimates of the persistent component ζt and the transi-
tory component ξt. The table shows that 66.5% of the cross sectional variance
of medical expenses are from the transitory component, and 33.5% from the
persistent component. The persistent component has an autocorrelation co-
eﬃcient of 0.922, however, so that innovations to the persistent component
of medical expenses have long-lived eﬀects. Most of a household’s lifetime
medical expense risk comes from the persistent component.
Parameter Variable Estimate (Standard Error)
ρm autocorrelation, persistent component 0.922 (0.010)
σ2
ǫ innovation variance, persistent component 0.050 (0.008)
σ2
ξ innovation variance, transitory component 0.665 (0.014)
Table 1: Persistence and variance of innovations to medical expenses (variances
as fractions of total cross-sectional variance).
Our estimates of medical expense risk indicate greater risk than found
in other studies (see Hubbard, et al. [38] and Palumbo [56]). However, our
estimates still potentially understate both the level and risk of the medical
expenses faced by older Americans, because our measure of medical expendi-
tures does not include the value of Medicaid contributions. As equation (11)
shows, some of the medical expenses (mt) in our model may be paid for by
the government through the provision of the consumption ﬂoor. Therefore,
the ideal measure of mt drawn from the data would include both the out-
of-pocket expenditures actually made by the consumer and the expenditures
covered by Medicaid. The AHEAD data, however, do not include Medicaid
expenditures. In this respect, the medical expense process we feed into our
benchmark model is a conservative one.
6.3 Income proﬁles
We model mean income in the same way as mean medical expenses, using
the same explanatory variables and the same ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator.
Figure 4 presents average non-asset income proﬁles, conditional on per-
manent income, computed by simulating our model. For those in the top
permanent income quintile, annual income averages $20,000 per year. Fig-
19Figure 4: Average income, by permanent income quintile.
ure 1 shows that median wealth for the youngest cohort in this income group
is slightly under $200,000, or about 10 years worth of income for this group.
6.4 Mortality and health status
We estimate the probability of death and bad health as logistic func-
tions of a cubic in age; sex; sex interacted with age; previous health status;
health status interacted with age; a quadratic in permanent income rank;
and permanent income rank interacted with age. A detailed description of
our estimates can be found in De Nardi et al. [21].
Using the estimated health transitions, survival probabilities, and the ini-
tial joint distribution of age, health, permanent income and sex found in our
AHEAD data, we simulate demographic histories. Table 2 presents predicted
life expectancies.8 Rich people, women, and healthy people live much longer
than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. Two extremes illustrate this
point: an unhealthy male at the bottom quintile of the permanent income
8Our predicted life expectancy is lower than what the aggregate statistics imply. In
2002, life expectancy at age 70 was 13.2 years for men and 15.8 years for women, whereas
our estimates indicate that life expectancy for men is 9.7 years for men and 14.3 years for
women. These diﬀerences stem from using data on singles only: when we re-estimate the
model for both couples and singles we ﬁnd that predicted life expectancy is within 1/2
year of the aggregate statistics for both men and women.
20distribution expects to live only 6 more years, that is, to age 76. In contrast,
a healthy woman at the top quintile of the permanent income distribution
expects to live 17 more years, thus making it to age 87. Such signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in life expectancy should, all else equal, lead to signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in saving behavior. In complementary work, (De Nardi et al. [22]), we
show this is in fact the case.
We also ﬁnd that for rich people the probability of living to very old ages,
and thus facing very high medical expenses, is signiﬁcant. For example,
using the same simulations used to construct Table 2, we ﬁnd that a healthy
70-year-old woman in the top quintile of the permanent income distribution
faces a 14% chance of living 25 years, to age 95.
7 Second step estimation results
Table 3 presents preference parameter estimates for several speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst column presents results for a parsimonious model with no bequest
motives and no health preference shifter. The second column reports esti-
mates for a model in which health can shift the marginal utility of consump-
tion. In the third column, the bequest motive is activated, and in the ﬁnal
column, both the bequest motive and the preference shifter are active. In all
cases, we set the interest rate to 2%.
Table 3 shows that the bequest parameters are never statistically signif-
icant and, as shown by the overidentiﬁcation statistics, have little eﬀect on
the model’s ﬁt.
When considered in isolation, the health preference parameter is not sig-
niﬁcant either. However, the ﬁnal column shows that this parameter is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant when bequest motives are included. An appropriate test,
however, is the joint test based on the change in the overidentiﬁcation statis-
tic (Newey and McFadden [54], section 9). Comparing the ﬁrst and last
columns of Table 3 shows that the test statistic decreases by 4.8, while 3
degrees of freedom are removed. With a χ2(3) distribution, this change has
a p-value of 18.7%, implying that we cannot reject the parsimonious model.
In short, the bequest and health preference parameters are (collectively)
not statistically signiﬁcant, do not help improve the ﬁt of the model, and,
moreover, have little eﬀect on any of the other parameter estimates. We thus
use the parsimonious model as our benchmark speciﬁcation and only brieﬂy
discuss the other conﬁgurations.
217.1 The benchmark model
The ﬁrst column of table 3 shows that the estimated coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is 3.8, the discount factor is .97, and the consumption ﬂoor is
$2,663. These estimates are within the range of parameter estimates provided
in the previous literature.
Our estimated coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, 3.8, is higher than
the coeﬃcients found by ﬁtting non-retiree consumption trajectories, either
through Euler equation estimation (e.g., Attanasio et al. [3]) or through the
method of simulated moments (Gourinchas and Parker [36]). It is, however,
at the lower end of the estimates found by Cagetti [12], who matched wealth
proﬁles with the method of simulated moments over the whole life cycle. It is
much lower than those produced by Palumbo [56], who matched consumption
data for retirees using maximum likelihood estimation. Given that our out-
of-pocket medical expenditure data indicate more risk than that found by
Palumbo, it is not surprising that we can match observed precautionary and
life-cycle savings with a lower level of risk aversion.
The consumption ﬂoor that we estimate ($2,700 in 1998 dollars) is similar
to the value that Palumbo [56] uses ($2,000 in 1985 dollars). However, our
estimate is about half the size of the value that Hubbard et al. [38] use, and
is also about half the average value of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
beneﬁts.
Our consumption ﬂoor proxies for Medicaid health insurance (which al-
most eliminates medical expenses to the ﬁnancially destitute) and SSI. Given
the complexity of these programs, and the fact that many potential recipients
do not fully participate in them, it is tricky to establish a priori what the con-
sumption ﬂoor should be. Individuals with income (net of medical expenses)
below the SSI limit are usually eligible for SSI and Medicaid. However, some
individuals with income above the SSI level can receive Medicaid beneﬁts,
depending on the state they live in. On the other hand, many eligible indi-
viduals do not draw SSI beneﬁts and Medicaid, suggesting that the value of
the consumption ﬂoor is much lower than the statutory beneﬁts.9 Our es-
timates likely provide an “eﬀective” consumption ﬂoor, one which combines
the complexity and variety of the statutory rules with people’s perceptions
and attitudes toward welfare eligibility. In appendix C, we show that ﬁxing
the consumption ﬂoor at $5,000 signiﬁcantly worsens the model’s ﬁt.
9For example, Elder and Powers [26] (Table 2), ﬁnd that less than 50 percent of those
eligible for SSI receive beneﬁts.
22The Euler equation (20) and asset accumulation equation (9) show that
the asset proﬁles generated by our model depend on expected and realized
interest rates. Our parameter estimates, especially those of the discount
factor β, therefore depend on our assumptions about the real interest rate
r. As a robustness check, we solve a model with i.i.d. interest rate shocks,
change the simulations to use the asset returns realized over the 1996-2006
period, and re-estimate the model. Appendix C shows the results. Although
the realized returns are on average higher than our benchmark assumption of
2%, and our estimated discount factors accordingly lower, our main ﬁndings
hold.
The Euler Equation can give some intuition for the estimates and their
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The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is identiﬁed by diﬀerences in saving
rates across the income distribution, in combination with the consumption
ﬂoor. Low income households are relatively more protected by the consump-
tion ﬂoor, and will thus have lower values of V art(∆lnct+1) and thus weaker
precautionary motives. The parameter ν helps the model explain why in-
dividuals with high permanent income typically display less asset decumu-
lation. Appendix C discusses the identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion and the consumption ﬂoor in more detail.
Figure 5 shows how the baseline model ﬁts a subset of the data proﬁles,
using unbalanced panels. (The model ﬁts equally well for the cells that
are not shown.) Both in the model and in the observed data individuals
with high permanent income tend to increase their wealth with age, whereas
individuals with low income tend to run down their wealth with age.
The visual evidence shown in Figure 5 is consistent with the test statistics
shown in Table 3. The p-value of the overidentiﬁcation statistic for our
baseline speciﬁcation is 87.3%. Hence, our model is not rejected by the over-
identiﬁcation test at any standard level of signiﬁcance. Both in the model
23Figure 5: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data and model.
and the data, individuals with high permanent income do not run down their
wealth with age, whereas those with low income do.
Turning to the mortality bias, Figure 6 shows simulated asset proﬁles, ﬁrst
for all simulated individuals alive at each date, and then for the individuals
surviving the entire simulation period. As in the data, restricting the proﬁles
to long-term survivors reveals much more asset decumulation. The mortality
bias generated by the model is large, reﬂecting heterogeneity in both saving
behavior and mortality patterns.
Given that the survival rate, st, is often much less than 1, it follows from
equation (21) that the model will generate downward-sloping, rather than
ﬂat, consumption proﬁles, unless the discount factor β is fairly large. Fig-
ure 7 shows simulated consumption proﬁles for ages 74-100. Except for the
last two years of life, consumption falls with age. This general tendency
is consistent with many empirical studies of older-age consumption. For
example, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger [29] ﬁnd that non-durable con-
sumption declines about one percent per year between ages 70 and 90. (Also
see Banks, Blundell, and Tanner [6].)
7.2 The model with health-dependent preferences
The second and fourth columns of Table 3 show point estimates of δ =
−.21 or δ = −.36: holding consumption ﬁxed, being in good health lowers
24Figure 6: Median assets by birth cohort: everyone in the simulations vs. sur-
vivors.
the marginal utility of consumption by 21-36%. This implies that an antici-
pated change from good to bad health leads consumption to increase by 6 to
10%, depending on the speciﬁcation (see equation (21)). Previous empirical
studies disagree on whether δ is greater than or less than 0. (See Lillard and
Weiss [49], Rust and Phelan [61], Viscusi and Evans [65] and Finkelstein et
al. [30] as examples.)
This parameter, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant (if considered
jointly with bequests), and none of the other parameter estimates are af-
fected by its inclusion.
7.3 The model with bequest motives
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show parameter estimates for
models that include a bequest motive. Because the two speciﬁcations deliver
similar parameter estimates, we focus on the results in the third column.
The point estimates of θ = 2,360 and k = 273,000 indicate that the con-
sumption level above which the bequest motive becomes operative is about
$36,000 per year. (See Appendix D for a derivation.) By way of comparison,
individuals in the top permanent income quintile have an average annuity
income of about $20,000 and hold less than $200,000 of assets. This sug-
gests that most people in our sample do not have a strong bequest motive.
25Figure 7: Median consumption by PI quintile: simulations.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that bequest motives are not very important for
ﬁtting our data; none of the estimated bequest parameters are statistically
signiﬁcant, and adding bequests does not signiﬁcantly improve the model’s
ﬁt.
For those suﬃciently rich, however, the marginal propensity to bequeath
above that consumption level is also high, with 88 cents of every extra dollar
above the threshold being left as bequests. (See Appendix D.) Hence one
can interpret our estimates as suggesting that the bequest motive could be
present for the richest people in our sample.
To show the model’s implications for bequests, Figure 8 displays the dis-
tribution of assets that individuals hold one period before their deaths.10
Comparing the two panels of Figure 8 highlights that the models with and
without the estimated bequest motive generate very similar distributions of
bequests. Both versions of the model also do a good job of matching the
distribution of assets before death found in the data, although both versions
10When AHEAD respondents die, their descendants are asked about the value of the es-
tate. However, problems of non-response are severe – 49% of all estate values are imputed.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether reported estates also include the value of the deceased
individual’s home. For these reasons we report the distribution of assets one year before
death rather than estates. Estates are somewhat lower than assets one year before death;
mean and median assets 1 year before death are $162,000 and $37,000, whereas mean and
median estates are $132,000 and $20,000.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution function of assets held 1 period before death:
data and model. Model with bequest motive in the left panel, and
without on the right panel. Legend: solid line is model, lighter line is
data.
Our ﬁndings should not be interpreted as a rejection of bequest motives in
general. Our sample is composed of elderly singles, who are poorer than cou-
ples (see for example D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez et al. [20]), and other evidence indicates
that bequests are a luxury good (De Nardi [17], and Dynan et al. [25]). Our
sample of singles may not contain enough rich households to reveal strong
bequest motives. Moreover, and importantly, a signiﬁcant fraction of our
sample is composed of people who have already lost their partner, and it
is possible that some of the estate was already split between the surviving
spouse and other heirs.
7.4 Summary
Our main results from the second step estimation can be summarized as
follows. First, our estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, time
discount factor, and consumption ﬂoor are within the range used in the pre-
vious literature. Second, we do not ﬁnd that health-dependent preferences
are important for understanding retirees’ saving behavior. Third, we do not
ﬁnd that bequest motives signiﬁcantly aﬀect the savings of most households
in our sample. Fourth, the model ﬁts the data closely, both in terms of
27the moment conditions that we match, and in terms of bequests distribution
that it generates. Finally, the model’s consumption implications are con-
sistent with previous empirical evidence. Put together, these ﬁndings give
us conﬁdence that we can use our benchmark model (without bequests and
preference shocks) to study how savings depend on medical expenses and the
consumption ﬂoor.
8 What are the important determinants of
savings?
To determine the importance of the key mechanisms in our model we
ﬁx the estimated parameters at their benchmark values and then change
one feature of the model at a time. For each of these diﬀerent economic
environments we compute the optimal saving decisions, simulate the model,
and compare the resulting asset accumulation proﬁles to the asset proﬁles
generated by the baseline model.
We display asset proﬁles for the AHEAD birth-year cohort whose mem-
bers were ages 72-76 (with an average age of 74) in 1996. To focus on un-
derlying changes in saving, we rule out attrition and assume every individual
lives to age 100. People will face the same risks and have the same expecta-
tions as before (except for the particular aspect changed in each experiment),
but in their realized lives they do not die and drop out of the simulations
until age 100. None of our conclusions would change if we were to also allow
for mortality bias.
First, we ask whether the out-of-pocket medical expenditures that we
estimate from the data are important drivers of old age savings. To answer
this question, we zero out all medical out-of-pocket medical expenditures for
everyone and look at the corresponding proﬁles. This could be seen as an
extreme form of insurance provided by the government.
Figure 9 shows that medical expenses are a big determinant of the elderly
people’s saving behavior, especially for those with high permanent income,
for whom those expenses are especially high, and who are relatively less
insured by the government-provided consumption ﬂoor. These retirees are
reducing their current consumption in order to pay for the high out-of-pocket
medical expenses they expect to bear later in life. For given initial wealth,
if there were no out-of-pocket medical expenses, individuals in the highest
28Figure 9: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model with no
medical expenses.
permanent-income quintile would deplete their net worth by age 94. In the
baseline model with medical expenses they keep almost $40,000 to pay for
out-of-pocket medical expenses in the last few years of life. The risk of
living long and having high medical expenses late in life increases savings.
This decomposition indicates that modeling out-of-pocket medical expenses
is important in evaluating policy proposals that aﬀect the elderly.
We next shut down out-of-pocket medical expense risk (the shocks ζ and
ξ), while keeping average medical expenditure constant (conditional on all
of the relevant state variables). Figure 10 shows the results. Interestingly,
and consistently with Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes [38], we ﬁnd that, con-
ditional on average medical expenses, the risk associated with the volatility
of medical expenses has only a small eﬀect on the proﬁles of median wealth.
Our results are also consistent with Palumbo’s [56] ﬁnding that eliminating
medical expense risk has only small eﬀects on consumption and assets.11
One reason why medical expense risk might not have a large eﬀect is that
11Figure 10 shows that eliminating medical expense risk sometimes causes assets to
increase. One reason for the increase is that when the variance of medical expenses is
reduced, the frequency of large medical expenses is also reduced, which in turn reduces
the fraction of medical expenses covered by Medicaid. Eliminating volatility in mt can
thus raise the average medical expense borne by retirees. Because this cost increase will
be highest at oldest ages, individuals will respond by accumulating more assets.
29Figure 10: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model with no
medical expense risk.
the consumption ﬂoor limits the eﬀects of catastrophic medical expenses. To
explore this eﬀect further, we reduce the consumption ﬂoor to 80% of its
value, that is from $2,663 to $2,100. One could interpret this as a reform
reducing the government-provided consumption safety net. The eﬀects of
this change are quite evident. Individuals respond to the increase in net
income uncertainty by keeping more assets to self-insure. Figure 11 shows
that reducing the consumption ﬂoor aﬀects the savings proﬁles of both low-
and high-permanent-income singles. The assets of the 90 year old in the
highest permanent income class increase from $100,000 to $120,000, while
those of the people of the same age but in the second highest income quintile
increase from $40,000 to $50,000. The net worth of those in the third and
fourth income quintiles also displays some increases. The consumption ﬂoor
thus matters for wealthy individuals as well as poor ones. This is perhaps
unsurprising given the size of our estimated medical expenses for the old
and income-rich; even wealthy households can be ﬁnancially decimated by
medical expenses in very old age.
30Figure 11: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model with
80% of the consumption ﬂoor.
9 Endogenous medical spending
To check the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to the assumption that medical
expenses are exogenous, we consider a more complex model in which retirees
optimally choose how much to spend on medical goods and services, as well
as on non-medical consumption. Our ﬁndings are robust to this extension.
We assume that retirees derive utility from consumption of both non-
medical and medical goods, with the relative weights on the two goods vary-
ing with age, health, and an idiosyncratic “medical needs” shock.
A complementary approach is that of Grossman [37], in which medical
expenses represent investments in health capital, which in turn decreases
mortality. While this is an appealing mechanism, the existing empirical lit-
erature suggests that these eﬀects are particularly small for the U.S elderly
for two reasons. First, the expenditures that we are considering are sup-
plementing Medicaid, Medicare, and insurance-provided medical goods and
services, which cover most life-threatening conditions. Second, the stock of
health carried by an elderly person is in large part determined by the health
investments that were made in the past, including those made by the person’s
parents in his or her childhood and even before birth. Hence, for our sample
of people aged 70 and older, the eﬀects of additional health investments are
not as large as, for example, in infancy.
31A key piece of empirical evidence comes from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, where a random set of individuals were given co-payment-free
health insurance over a 3- to 5-year period, while a control group faced
standard co-payments. Brook et al. [9] found that even though the group
with free health care utilized medical services much more intensively than
the control group, the additional treatments had only a “minimal inﬂuence”
on subsequent health outcomes.
Surprisingly, some empirical studies show that even programs such as
Medicare, which sometimes help pay for critical treatments, do not signiﬁ-
cantly increase life expectancy. For example, Finkelstein and McKnight [31]
“ﬁnd no compelling evidence that, in its ﬁrst 10 years, Medicare reduced
overall elderly mortality.” They also note that, more in general, the litera-
ture on the eﬀects of health insurance “points strongly to no or only very
modest health beneﬁts.” Fisher et al. [32] study regional variations in Medi-
care spending, and conclude that individuals in high-spending regions ”do
not have better health outcomes.” More in line with what one might expect,
Card et al. [13] ﬁnd that Medicare caused a small reduction in mortality
among 65-year-olds admitted through emergency rooms for “non-deferrable”
conditions.
For these reasons some recent structural models have supplemented Gross-
man’s mechanism with the direct utility eﬀects that we use. For example
Khwaja [45] ﬁnds that “medical utilization would only decline by less than
20% over the life cycle if medical care was purely mitigative and had no
curative or preventive components.” (Also see Blau and Gilleskie [8], and
Davis [16].)
Given that the existing evidence indicates that the eﬀect of additional
medical spending on life expectancy is small (and especially so for the elderly)
and that allowing for this additional eﬀect would complicate the model and
require the estimation of many additional parameters, we focus on the utility
eﬀects of medical expenditures.
9.1 The endogenous medical expenditure model
At the beginning of each period the individual’s health status and medical
needs shocks are realized and need-based transfers are given. The individ-
ual then chooses consumption, medical expenditure, and saves. Finally the
survival shock hits. If the person dies, the estate is passed on to one’s heir.












where t is age, ct is consumption of non-medical goods, mt is total consump-
tion of medical goods, ht is health status, and  (·) is the medical needs shock,
which aﬀects the marginal utility of consuming medical goods and services.
The consumption of both types of goods is expressed in dollar values. The
substitution elasticities for the two goods, however, can diﬀer.
As before, we allow the need for medical services to have a temporary (ξt)
and a persistent (ζt) component; we recycle the variable names to save on
notation. We assume that these shocks follow the same processes as in equa-
tions (7) and (8), with potentially diﬀerent parameters. It is worth stressing
that we not allow any of these shocks to depend on permanent income; in-
come aﬀects medical expenditures solely through the budget constraint.
We model two important features of the health care system:
1. Private and public insurance pay the share 1 − q(t,ht) of the total
medical costs incurred by the retiree. Its complement, q(t,ht), is the
out-of-pocket share paid by the retiree. We estimate q(t,ht) as part of
our ﬁrst-stage estimation. (See Appendix B for details.)
2. Social insurance, such as Medicaid and SSI, provide monetary trans-
fers that vary with ﬁnancial resources and medical needs. We model
these transfers as providing a ﬂow utility ﬂoor. The transfers thus
depend on the retirees’ state variables, not least their medical needs
shocks. For a given utility ﬂoor and state vector, we ﬁnd the transfer
b∗(·) = b∗(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) that puts each retiree’s utility at the ﬂoor.
Transfers then kick in to provide the minimum utility level to retirees
who lack the resources to aﬀord it
b(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) = max{0,b
∗(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt)}. (23)
As before, we impose that if transfers are positive, the individual con-
sumes all of his resources (by splitting them optimally between the two
goods), so that at+1 = 0.
33The retiree’s value function is given by



















subject to equations (23), (18), (10), and
at+1 = at + yn(rat + yt) + b(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) − ct − mtq(t,ht). (25)
9.2 Estimation
The log of the medical needs shifter  t is modeled as a function of: a
cubic in age; current health status; and health status interacted with age.
The combined variance of the shocks ζt+ξt is modelled as a quadratic in age;
current health status; and health status interacted with age. To identify these
parameters, we expand the moment conditions described by equation (19) to
include moments relating to: mean medical expenses by age and birth cohort,
for each half of the permanent income distribution; the 90th percentile of
medical expenses in the same cells; and the ﬁrst and second autocorrelations
for medical expenses in each cell.12 Detailed moment conditions can be found
in Appendix A. In all other respects our MSM procedure is the same as
before.
9.3 Results
The preference parameter estimates for the endogenous medical expendi-
ture model are shown in Appendix C. The new estimate of β, the discount
factor is 0.99, is slightly higher than the benchmark estimate of 0.97. The
estimate of ν, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for “regular” consump-
tion is 2.15, while the estimate of ω, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
12Since the AHEAD medical expenses data are reported net of any Medicaid payment,
we net out government transfers(bt) from the medical expenses generated by the model.
Hence, AHEAD medical expenses and model-generated ones are both net of Medicaid
payments.
34for medical goods is 3.19, so that the demand for medical goods is less elas-
tic than the demand for consumption. Both coeﬃcients are similar to, but
somewhat smaller than, the benchmark estimate of 3.82.
Figure 12: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data and endogenous med-
ical expenditure model.
The model also requires parameter estimates for the mean of the logged
medical needs shifter  (t,ht,ζt,ξt) and the process for the shocks ζt and ξt.
The estimates for these parameters (available from the authors on request)
show that the demand for medical services rises rapidly with age.
Although the overidentiﬁcation test statistic shows that the model with
endogenous medical expenditure is rejected by the data, the model does
match the main patterns of the asset proﬁles (see Figure 12). Furthermore,
the model ﬁts the medical expense distribution rather well: see Appendices B
and C.
Out-of-pocket (and total) medical expenses in the endogenous medical ex-
penditure model can be eliminated by setting the medical needs parameter  t
to zero. Figure 13 shows that the eﬀects of eliminating medical expenses are
similar to those found in the exogenous medical expense model (Figure 9).
Given that the consumer must prepare for the same pattern of medical ex-
penditures in either model, this is not surprising. Retirees will save for high
medical expenditures at old ages whether the expenditures are exogenous
shocks estimated from the data or medical expenditure choices consistent
with the same data.
35Figure 13: Median assets: baseline endogenous medical expense model, with and
without medical expenses.
Figure 14 shows the eﬀects of reducing the generosity of social insurance
by 50% for both the exogenous medical expenses model and the endogenous
one with a utility ﬂoor.13 As in the exogenous medical expenditure model, a
change in social insurance aﬀects the savings of all income groups, including
the richest. The eﬀects are of course smaller, because retirees in the en-
dogenous medical expense model can adjust medical expenditures as well as
consumption.
In sum, the endogenous medical expense model conﬁrms and reinforces
our conclusion that medical expenses are a major savings motive, and that
social insurance aﬀects the saving of the income-rich as well as that of the
income-poor. Our main ﬁndings appear thus robust to the way in which we
model the medical expenditure decision.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we construct, estimate, and analyze a rich model of saving
for retired single people. In doing so, we provide several contributions.
13In the endogenous medical expense model, we index the estimated utility ﬂoor by the
consumption level that provides the ﬂoor when µ = 1. To run the counterfactual, we cut
that consumption level in half.
36Figure 14: Median assets: baseline and model with 50% of the consumption ﬂoor
for the exogenous (left panel) and endogenous (right panel) medical
expense models.
First, we estimate the out-of-pocket medical expenses faced by the elderly
using a larger data set (that includes nursing home expenses) and more ﬂexi-
ble functional forms than in the previous literature. As a result, we ﬁnd that
medical expenses are much higher and more volatile than previously esti-
mated, that they rise very fast with age. Also, at very advanced ages (that is
starting from about age 80), medical expenses are very much a luxury good;
i.e., they are much higher for individuals with higher permanent income.
Second, we estimate mortality probabilities by age as a function of health,
sex, and permanent income and ﬁnd large variations along all three dimen-
sions. We ﬁnd that in an unbalanced panel, mortality bias—the tendency of
rich people to live longer—is signiﬁcant.
Third, we construct and estimate a structural model of saving using the
method of simulated moments. As a result of our improved data and richer
speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that not only our parameter estimates are consistent
with the existing estimates from the literature, but also that our model can
explain many important features of the data, unlike previously found. In
particular, our estimated structural model ﬁts saving proﬁles across the entire
income distribution, and reproduces the observation that elderly people with
high permanent income have a smaller dissaving rate than elderly people
with low permanent income.
Our model and estimates imply that the pattern of out-of-pocket medical
expenses by age and permanent income is a key determinant of savings. If
37single people live to very advanced ages, they are almost sure to need very
expensive medical care, and they thus choose to keep a large amount of
assets (an amount increasing in permanent income, as medical expenses also
increase) to self-insure against this risk. We also ﬁnd that a publicly-provided
consumption ﬂoor has a large eﬀect on the asset proﬁles of all people, even
those with high income. Our ﬁndings are robust to endogenizing medical
expenditures in an empirically realistic way.
In short, we ﬁnd that out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and the way
in which they interact with the consumption ﬂoor, go a long way toward
explaining the elderlys’ saving decisions and are very important elements
that should be included in models evaluating old-age policy reforms.
Following up on our ﬁndings, several recent papers have incorporated
medical expenses and government insurance programs in general equilibrium,
heterogeneous agent, life-cycle settings, and used these models to study the
eﬀects of various policy reforms. Kopecky and Koreshkova [47] ﬁnd that
nursing home expenses are a major savings motive for the wealthy, and es-
timate that Medicaid and other social insurance programs for the elderly
crowd out a large fraction of savings. Imrohoroglu and Kitao [42], Jeske and
Kitao [43] and Attanasio, et al. [5] use similar models to study the eﬀects of
Social Security reforms, tax policies on employer-provided health insurance
and Medicare, respectively. Paschenko [57] adopts a model similar to ours to
study why few retirees purchase annuities.
Applying our ﬁndings to policy evaluation also highlights the value of ex-
tending our analysis, which is currently for elderly singles, to elderly couples.
One way in which couples may diﬀer from singles is in the importance of be-
quests. Our estimates imply that while bequest motives are potentially quite
important for the wealthy, for most of our sample they have relatively little
eﬀect: in our data, median net worth in the top permanent income quin-
tile is less than $200,000. The parameter values for this bequest motive are
imprecisely estimated as well, probably because we do not have enough rich
people in our sample. Bequest motives may well play a larger role in married
households, who are generally richer than single households, and who proba-
bly wish to ensure that if one spouse dies the surviving spouse is ﬁnancially
secure. Because bequests and out-of-pocket medical expenditures are both
luxury goods, pinning down their relative contributions will be challenging
as well as important.
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45Appendix A: Moment conditions and asymptotic distri-
bution of parameter estimates
Benchmark model
In the model with exogenous medical expenses, our estimate, ˆ ∆, of the
“true” M × 1 preference vector ∆0 is the value of ∆ that minimizes the
(weighted) distance between the estimated life cycle proﬁles for assets found
in the data and the simulated proﬁles generated by the model. For each
calendar year t ∈ {t0,...,tT} = {1996,1998,2000,2002,2004,2006}, we match
median assets for Q = 5 permanent income quintiles in P = 5 birth year
cohorts.14 The 1996 (period-t0) distribution of simulated assets, however, is
bootstrapped from the 1996 data distribution, and thus we match assets to
the data for 1998, ..., 2006. In addition, we require each cohort-income-age
cell have at least 10 observations to be included in the GMM criterion. In
the end we have a total of J = 101 moment conditions.
Suppose that individual i belongs to birth cohort p, and his permanent
income level falls in the qth permanent income quintile. Let apqt(∆,χ) denote
the model-predicted median asset level for individuals in individual i’s group
at time t, where χ includes all parameters estimated in the ﬁrst stage (in-
cluding the permanent income boundaries). Assuming that observed assets
have a continuous conditional density, apqt will satisfy
Pr
￿
ait ≤ apqt(∆0,χ0)|p,q,t,individual i observed at t
￿
= 1/2.
The preceding equation can be rewritten as a moment condition (Manski [52],




1{ait ≤ apqt(∆0,χ0)} − 1/2|p,q,t,individual i observed at t
￿
= 0. (26)
Equation (26) is merely equation (19) in the main text, adjusted to allow
for “missing” as well as deceased individuals. Continuing, we can convert

















14Because we do not allow for macro shocks, in any given cohort t is used only to identify
the individual’s age.
46for p ∈ {1,2,...,P}, q ∈ {1,2,...,Q}, t ∈ {t1,t2...,tT}.
Suppose we have a data set of I independent individuals that are each
observed at up to T separate calendar years. Let ϕ(∆;χ0) denote the J-
element vector of moment conditions described immediately above, and let
ˆ ϕI(.) denote its sample analog. Letting c WI denote a J×J weighting matrix,






′c WI ˆ ϕI(∆;χ0),
where τ is the ratio of the number of observations to the number of simulated
observations.
In practice, we estimate χ0 as well, using the approach described in the
main text. Computational concerns, however, compel us to treat χ0 as known
in the analysis that follows. Under regularity conditions stated in Pakes and
Pollard [55] and Duﬃe and Singleton [23], the MSM estimator ˆ ∆ is both




ˆ ∆ − ∆0
￿
  N(0,V),
with the variance-covariance matrix V given by













is the J × M gradient matrix of the population moment vector; and W =






−1ˆ ϕI(ˆ ∆;χ0)   χ
2
J−M,
where R−1 is the generalized inverse of
R = PSP,




The asymptotically eﬃcient weighting matrix arises when c WI converges
to S−1, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the data. When
47W = S−1, V simpliﬁes to (1 + τ)(D′S−1D)−1, and R is replaced with S.
This is the matrix we use for all the results shown in this paper.
But even though the optimal weighting matrix is asymptotically eﬃcient,
it can be biased in small samples. (See, for example, Altonji and Segal [1].)
To check for robustness, we also use a “diagonal” weighting matrix, as sug-
gested by Pischke [58]. This diagonal weighting scheme uses the inverse of
the matrix that is the same as S along the diagonal and has zeros oﬀ the di-
agonal of the matrix. This matrix delivers parameter estimates very similar
to our benchmark estimates.
We estimate D, S and W with their sample analogs. For example, our
estimate of S is the J × J estimated variance-covariance matrix of the sam-
ple data. When estimating this matrix, we use sample statistics, so that
apqt(∆,χ) is replaced with the sample median for group pqt.
One complication in estimating the gradient matrix D is that the func-
tions inside the moment condition ϕ(∆;χ) are non-diﬀerentiable at certain
data points; see equation (27). This means that we cannot consistently esti-
mate D as the numerical derivative of ˆ ϕI(.). Our asymptotic results therefore
do not follow from the standard GMM approach, but rather the approach
for non-smooth functions described in Pakes and Pollard [55], Newey and
McFadden [54] (section 7) and Powell [59].
To ﬁnd D, it is helpful to rewrite equation (27) as
Pr
￿




























It follows that the rows of D are given by
Pr
￿



























, the conditional p.d.f. of assets eval-
uated at the median apqt, with a kernel density estimator written by Kon-
ing [46].
48The model with endogenous medical expenditures
To estimate the model with endogenous medical expenses, we add several
moment conditions relating to medical expenses. To use these moment con-
ditions, we ﬁrst simulate medical expenses at an annual frequency, and then
take two-year averages to produce a measure of medical expenses comparable
to the ones contained in the AHEAD.
Because we are interested in the possibility of catastrophic medical ex-
penses, especially at very old ages, it is important that each cohort-income-
age cell have a fairly large number of observations. To ensure this we split
the income distribution in half, rather than into quintiles, so that that the
quintile index q lies in {1,2}. As before, we divide individuals into 5 cohorts,
and match data from 5 waves covering the period 1998-2006.
To ﬁt the upper tail of the medical expense distribution, we require the
model to match the 90th percentile of out-of-pocket medical expenditures in
each cohort-income-age cell. Let m90
pqt(∆,χ) denote the model-predicted 90th
percentile for individuals in cohort p and permanent income half q at time


















for p ∈ {1,2,...,P}, q ∈ {1,2}, t ∈ {t1,t2...,tT}.
We also require the model to match mean medical expenses (in levels,
not logs) in each cell. Let mpqt(∆,χ) denote the model-predicted mean. The
associated moment condition is
E
￿













Finally, to pin down the autocorrelation coeﬃcient for ζ (ρm), and its
contribution to the total variance ζ + ξ, we require the model to match the
ﬁrst and second autocorrelations of logged medical expenses. Deﬁne the
residual Rit as
Rit = ln(mit) − lnmpqt,
lnmpqt = E(ln(mit)|pi = p,qi = q,t),






it|pi = p,qi = q,t
￿
.
Both lnmpqt and σpqt can be estimated non-parametrically as elements of χ.





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
pi = p,qi = q
!
.
Let ACpqtj(∆,χ) be the jth autocorrelation coeﬃcient implied by the model,
calculated using model values of lnmpqt and σpqt. The resulting moment














× 1{individual i observed at t & t − 1}
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ t
!
= 0, (33)





















To summarize, the moment conditions used to estimate model with en-
dogenous medical expenses consist of: the moments for asset medians de-
scribed by equation (27); the moments for the 90th percentile of medical
expenses described by equation (31); the moments for mean medical ex-
penses described by equation (32); and the moments for the autocorrelations
of logged medical expenses described by equations (33) and (34). The GMM
criterion function, standard errors, and overidentiﬁcation test statistic are
straightforward extensions of those used in the baseline model.
50Appendix B: Data and ﬁrst-stage results
Overview of the AHEAD data
The AHEAD data provides high quality information on, amongst other
things, mortality, medical expenses, income, and wealth.
If it is discovered that a sample member dies, this is recorded and veriﬁed
using the National Death Index. Attrition for reasons other than death
is relatively rare. Furthermore, the mortality rates we estimate from the
AHEAD are very similar to the aggregate statistics, giving us conﬁdence in
the data.
We consider only single retired individuals in the analysis. We drop all in-
dividuals who were either married or co-habiting at any point in the analysis
(so we include individuals who were never married with those who were di-
vorced or widowed by wave 1), which leaves us with 3,498 individuals. After
dropping individuals with missing wave 1 labor income data and individuals
with over $3,000 in labor income in any wave, we are left with 3,259 individ-
uals, of whom 592 are men and 2,667 are women. Of these 3,259 individuals,
884 are still alive in 2006.
We use the RAND release of the data for all variables, although we aug-
ment the RAND medical expense data. Parameter estimates and documen-
tation for out-of-pocket medical expenses, mortality rates, and health tran-
sition probabilities are available at: http://www.chicagofed.org/
economic research and data/economists preview.cfm?autID=29.
Assets
One problem with asset data is that the wealthy tend to underreport their
wealth in all household surveys (Davies and Shorrocks [15]). This leads to
understating asset levels at all ages. However, Juster et al. [44] show that the
wealth distribution of the AHEAD matches up well with aggregate values for
all but the richest 1% of households. However, problems of wealth underre-
porting seem particularly severe for 1994 AHEAD wave (see Rohwedder et
al. [60]). As a result, we do not use the 1994 wealth data in our estimation
procedure. (We use other 1994 data, however, in constructing the income,
health, and mortality proﬁles.) Given that, and the fact that we are match-
ing median assets (conditional on permanent income), the underreporting by
the very wealthy should not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results.
Figure 15 shows the full set of asset proﬁles we use in the analysis.
51Figure 15: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data.
Medical expenses
The measure of medical expenditures contained in the AHEAD is average
medical expenditures over the last two years. For surviving individuals, we
use the RAND release of medical expense data. RAND has not coded medical
expenses that people incur in their last year of life. However, the AHEAD
data include follow-up interviews of the deceased’s survivors. These follow-
up interviews include information on medical expenses in the last year of
life. Because AHEAD respondents were asked only a limited set of questions
about their medical spending in 1994, we use medical expense data from 1996
onwards.
Because medical expeditures in the AHEAD are two-year averages, while
our model operates at an annual frequency, we multiply the two-year vari-
ance residual variance by 1.424. This adjustment, based on the “Standard
Lognormal” Model shown in Table 7 of French and Jones [34], gives us the
variance in one-year medical expenditures that would, when averaged over
two years, match the variance seen in the two-year data.15
Figure 16 compares the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of out-
of-pocket medical expenditures found in the data with that produced by the
15To keep mean medical expenses (as opposed to their log) constant, this variance adjust-
ment is accompanied by an adjustment to the log mean. A description of this adjustment
can be found in our on-line documentation.
52models with exogenous and endogenous medical expenditures. In contrast
to Figure 3, which illustrates the medical expense process we feed into the
model, Figure 16 shows model-generated medical expenses that are net of
government transfers, as modelled by the consumption ﬂoor. Both models





































































Figure 16: Cumulative distribution function of medical expenses: data and the
exogenous (left panel) and endogenous (right panel) medical expen-
diture models. Legend: solid line is model, lighter line is data.
The CDF for the model with exogenous medical expenses lies slightly
above the CDF for the data until about $40K, and thus understates the
probability of large medical expenditures. This is not surprising because, due
to the nature of the AHEAD data, the exogenous medical expense process
is estimated on out-of-pocket expenditures net of Medicaid payments that,
ideally, should have been included.
The model with endogenous medical expenditures, in contrast, explicitly
accounts for this kind of censoring. As a result, the moment conditions used
to estimate the process for the “medical needs” shocks use model-generated
and actual data that account for Medicaid payments in the same way. This
should and in fact does increase the estimated probability of large medical
expenses, relative to the exogenous medical expense model. The second panel
of Figure 16 shows that the CDF for the endogenous model understates the
probability of low medical expenses, but ﬁts the upper tail of the distribution
(beginning around $20K) quite well.
Co-insurance rates
53We also use the AHEAD data to estimate the co-insurance rate q(t,ht).
Recall that in all waves AHEAD respondents are asked about what medical
expenses they paid out of pocket. In 1998, 2000, and 2002 they were also
asked about total billable medical expenses (including what is paid for by
insurance). We measure the co-insurance rate as the amount spent out of
pocket (less insurance premia) divided by the total billable medical expenses.
Following Yogo [66] we regress the log of this on an age polynomial and health
status, and health status interacted with age. We ﬁnd that the co-insurance
rate falls with age and for people in bad health.
Appendix C: More estimation results
The ﬁrst column of results in Table 4 reports the parameter estimates
from our benchmark model.
The second column of Table 4 shows estimates for a version of the bench-
mark model with an exogenously ﬁxed consumption ﬂoor. This is meant to
further investigate whether the risk aversion parameter and the consump-
tion ﬂoor are separately identiﬁed. Raising the consumption ﬂoor to $5,000
exposes consumers to less risk: the model compensates by raising the esti-
mated value of ν to 6.0. This adjustment to ν, however, is not enough to
prevent a signiﬁcant worsening of the model’s ﬁt. When the consumption
ﬂoor is set exogenously to $5,000, the overidentiﬁcation test statistic rises
from 82.3 to 110.2. The diﬀerence of 17.9 should be compared with the crit-
ical value of a χ2 of degree 1 (which is 3.8) because we are imposing one
parameter restriction. Therefore, this restriction is rejected and shows that
c is identiﬁed.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show the parameter estimates
that arise when the model is solved for an i.i.d rate of return and the simu-
lations use the year-by-year realized rates of returns over the sample period.
We use two measures of returns. The ﬁrst one, used in column (3), is the
return series calculated by Blau [7], updated to cover the period 1976-2008.
Over this period, Blau’s series has a mean of 0.9% and standard deviation
of 2.9%. The dynamic programming problem is solved using these numbers.
In the simulations, we feed in the rates of return that were realized in each
given year, starting from 1997 and until 2005. (Initial cash-on-hand for 1996
is not changed.) The average rate of return over this shorter time period was
3.1%.
54The second measure of returns, used in column (4), is an update of the
series in French et al. [33]. Based on data from 1960 to 1995, French et
al.’s series has a mean of 4.3% and standard deviation of 2.3%. The model’s
decision rules are found using these numbers. The average rate of return over
the 1997-2005 period was 6.0%. As in the Blau case, the simulations use the
rates of return realized in each of these years.
Interestingly, even using French et al.’s series, where the realized rate of
return is four percentage points higher than in our benchmark model, has
little eﬀect on ν, which drops from 3.81 to 3.24, and on the consumption
ﬂoor, which drops from $2,663 to $ 2,257. In contrast, the discount factor
falls almost exactly by the increase in realized interest rates, from 0.97 to
0.93. This conﬁrms that we cannot separately identify β and 1+r, but only
their product. The intuition for why this is diﬃcult comes from the Euler
equation, which shows that β and 1 + r enter as a product.
Medical expenditures and the consumption ﬂoor continue to be important
determinants of savings under the alternative rates of return. As an example,
Figure 17 shows that for the models estimated with these return series, the
eﬀects of eliminating medical expenses are still large.
Figure 17: Median Assets, with and without medical expenses. Left panel:
model using Blau’s returns. Right panel: model using French et al.’s
returns.
The ﬁfth column of Table 4 shows the preference parameters for the model
with endogenous medical expenses. These results have been discussed in the
main text. Estimating the model with endogenous medical expenditures also
requires us to ﬁnd the parameters of the log of the medical needs shifter
55 (t,ht,ζt,ξt). Figure 18 shows that, at the estimated parameter values, the
model ﬁts the medical expenditure data well. Figure 18 compares observed
and simulated proﬁles for the mean and the 90th percentile of the medical
expenditure distribution, by cohort and permanent income. The ﬁgure shows
that the model slightly under-predicts medical expenditures, but captures
well the way in which expenditures rise with both age and permanent income.
Appendix D: Interpreting the size of the bequest motive
To get a sense of the size of the bequest motive, consider a person who
starts the period with cash-on-hand x, dies for sure the next period without
incurring any medical expenses, and is in good health. Assume further that
this person’s assets are well below the estate taxation exemption level. The
budget constraint for such a person is given by e = (1 + r)(x − c), where e
is the bequest (estate) left. The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution
implies that the marginal utility of consumption today equals the appropri-
ately discounted marginal utility of bequests. Using the budget constraint
and our ﬁrst order condition we can solve for optimal bequests:
e =
1 + r
1 + r + f
(fx − k), (35)
where k is the shift parameter introduced in equation (3), and f is a function
of several preference parameters. Since bequests cannot be negative, the
expression for e reveals that x has to be large (> k/f) before the person will
leave any bequests. If x is not suﬃciently large, then c = x and the solutions
just derived do not apply. Assuming that x is in fact large enough, the









Using the parameter values in the third column of Table 3, we ﬁnd that
marginal propensity to bequeath is 0.88, and the bequest motive becomes
operative at x = $36,000. In a dynamic model, where the odds of dying in
any given period are low, x should be interpreted not as the total stock of
wealth, but as its annuity or consumption value. The bequest motive appears
to be strong, but only at very high levels of wealth.
56Figure 18: Medical expenditures: data and endogenous medical expenditure
model. Left panel: means. Right panel: 90th percentile.
57Income Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Quintile Male Male Female Female All†
bottom 7.6 5.9 12.8 10.9 11.1
second 8.4 6.6 13.8 12.0 12.4
third 9.3 7.4 14.7 13.2 13.1
fourth 10.5 8.4 15.7 14.2 14.4







Notes: Life expectancies calculated through simulations using estimated
health transition and survivor functions; †Calculations use the gender
and health distributions observed in each permanent income quintile;
‡Calculations use the health and permanent income distributions observed
for each gender; ⋄Calculations use the gender and permanent income distri-
butions observed for each health status group.
Table 2: Life expectancy in years, conditional on reaching age 70.
58With health-
dependent With
Benchmark preferences bequests All
ν: relative risk aversion coeﬀ. 3.81 3.75 3.84 3.66
(0.50) (0.47) (0.55) (0.55)
β: discount factor 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
δ: preference shifter 0.0 -0.21 0.0 -0.36
NA (0.18) NA (0.14)
θ: bequest intensity 0.0 0.0 2,360 2,419
NA NA (8,122) (1,886)
k: bequest curvature (in 000s) 273 215
(446) (150)
c: consumption ﬂoor 2,663 2,653 2,665 2,653
(346) (337) (353) (337)
Overidentiﬁcation test 82.3 80.6 81.5 77.5
Degrees of freedom 98 97 96 95
p-value 87.4% 88.5% 85.4% 90.5%
Table 3: Estimated structural parameters. Standard errors are in parentheses
below estimated parameters. NA refers to parameters ﬁxed for a given
estimation.
59Cases†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ν: RRA, consumption 3.81 6.04 3.72 3.24 2.15
(0.50) (1.01) (0.50) (0.37) (0.055)
ω: RRA, medical expenses 3.19
(0.054)
β: discount factor 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.99
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
c: consumption ﬂoor 2,663 5,000 2,658 2,257
(346) NA (367) (397)
c: utility ﬂoor‡ 202
(23.4)
Overidentiﬁcation test 82.3 110.2 81.5 80.3 667.0
Degrees of freedom 98 99 98 98 242
p-value overidentiﬁcation test 87.4% 20.7% 88.5% 90.4% 0.0%
† Cases: (1) Benchmark speciﬁcation; (2) c = 5,000; (3) Blau return series;
(4) French et al. return series; (5) Endogenous medical expenses.
‡ In the endogenous medical expense model, the estimated utility ﬂoor is in-
dexed by the consumption level that provides the ﬂoor when µ = 1. This
consumption value is not comparable to the consumption ﬂoor.
Table 4: Estimated preference parameters. Standard errors are in parentheses
below estimated parameters. NA refers to parameters ﬁxed for a given
estimation .
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